Research on the gender gap in American politics has focused on average differences between male and female voters. This has led to an underdeveloped understanding of sources of heterogeneity among women and, in particular, a poor understanding of the political preferences of Republican women. We argue that although theories of ideological sorting suggest gender gaps should exist primarily between political parties, gender socialization theories contend that critical differences lie at the intersection of gender and party such that gender differences likely persist within political parties. Using survey data from the 2012 American National Election Study, we evaluate how party and gender intersect to shape policy attitudes. We find that gender differences in policy attitudes are more pronounced in the Republican Party than in the Democratic Party, with Republican women reporting significantly more moderate views than their male counterparts. Mediation analysis reveals that the gender gaps within the Republican Party are largely attributable to gender differences in beliefs about the appropriate scope of government and attitudes toward gender-based inequality. These results afford new insight into the joint influence of gender and partisanship on policy preferences and raise important questions about the quality of representation Republican women receive from their own party. 1 In recent years, the U.S. has seen a rise in high-profile Republican women running for office and the development of a conservative women's movement (Schreiber 2008; . The surge in conservative appeals to women, coupled with the increased salience of and polarization on "women's issues"-e.g. the Mommy Wars, the Republican War on Womenrequires that scholars revisit the conventional wisdom about women's political identities.
Building on the burgeoning body of research on partisan sorting, we develop expectations regarding the intersection between gender and party. Theories of partisan sorting suggest that women and men sort themselves into the party that best represents their views-such that the gender gap occurs primarily across parties and gender gaps within parties are minimized. This claim seems at odds with theories of gender differences linked to socialization and social roles, which contend that women's shared experiences likely have political consequences that cut across partyraising the possibility of within-party gender gaps. To investigate public opinion at the intersection of gender and party, we first document patterns of public opinion across ten different policy issues using the 2012 American National Election Study (ANES). Our analysis shows that although policy preferences are primarily governed by partisan identification, gender still influences opinion. In particular, Republican women exhibit significantly more moderate policy preferences than Republican men in several issue areas.
Our results suggest that although party sorting accommodates most gender differences in policy preferences, it fails to account for all gender differences in public opinion. Within party gender gaps persist, particularly among Republicans. This raises a second question: What explains gender differences in public opinion among Republicans? We draw on social role and system justification theories of gender differences to develop hypotheses that the Republican gender gap in policy preferences originates from core values and status-oriented beliefs. Using mediation analysis, we show that two of these factors-support for limited government and beliefs about gender inequality in society-largely mediate the relationship between gender and issue support, explaining much of the Republican gender gaps in issue attitudes.
Our findings afford new insights into the joint influence of gender and partisanship on policy preferences and carry important implications for the representation of Republican women.
We know from previous research that female legislators are more likely to represent women's policy parties-at least with respect to gender. If men and women are sorting themselves into the party that best represents their policy preferences, there should be minimal differences between men and women within the same party. As such, controlling for party should eliminate any residual effect of gender on political attitudes. To capture this expectation, we posit the following hypothesis:
The Party-Sorting Hypothesis: To the extent that polarization and sorting mechanisms place men and women into the party that most closely approximates their views, gender gaps in policy preferences should exists primarily between political parties, with minimal observable differences in issue positions between men and women of the same party.
Moreover, gender differences within and across parties may be related to citizens' levels of political engagement. The sorting literature demonstrates that sorting occurs among politically engaged citizens, who are most tuned in to party polarization and position-taking (Abramowitz 2010; Gillion et al. 2015) . These citizens are best able to match the cues they receive from elites to their own political preferences. Because engaged partisans are more likely to have sorted and also more likely to be polarized themselves (e.g. Abramowitz and Saunders 2008), engaged men and women are likely to be more united in their policy positions than less engaged men and women.
Specifically, we test the following hypothesis:
The Engaged-Partisans Hypothesis: Because sorting occurs among the most politically aware and engaged citizens, we will observe fewer gender differences among highly engaged partisans relative to less engaged partisans of the same party.
Evaluating Gender Gaps in Policy Support
To evaluate how party sorting relates to gender differences in public opinion, we use data from the 2012 ANES to identify average gender gaps within parties for ten policy issues: abortion, childcare, education, healthcare, welfare, gay rights, immigration, the millionaire tax, defense spending, and gun control. We selected these issues because they have been identified as important in the party sorting literature, the gender gap literature, or because they were salient in the 2012 election cycle. Measurement information is provided in the Online Appendix. We use Adjusted American Party Women 7
Wald tests to compare weighted mean issue positions for male and female Republicans and Democrats across the range of policies. These mean preferences and confidence intervals are graphed in Figure 1 .
2 The x-axis lists the policy areas, and the y-axis represents policy preferences, with high scores corresponding to more conservative positions. The policy measures are standardized (with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one) to facilitate comparisons across issues. The confidence intervals surrounding the means allow us to evaluate whether there is a statistically significant difference between groups at the 95% confidence level.
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As one might expect, Figure 1a demonstrates that there are gender gaps across most of the policy areas in our analysis, with women generally holding more liberal attitudes than men. However, party qualifies the observed gender differences in important ways. Figure 1b shows that Republican and Democratic respondents are sharply divided in their policy positions across every issue area examined here. Republicans consistently exhibit more conservative policy preferences than Democrats, indicating that on average respondents are sorted along party lines. The general trends in Figure 1b provide support for the Party-Sorting Hypothesis. Nonetheless, important differences exist between men and women of the same party for several of the policy areas.
The Gender Gap among Republicans
First, looking at Republicans, women tend to favor government spending on social welfare programs more so than men. Specifically, women are more supportive of spending on child care Survey weights are applied. All observed gaps, except for the abortion gender gap among Republicans, hold even after controlling for socioeconomic and demographic variables (see Table 1 ). The direction of the abortion gap is reversed when controls variables are included the in the model. Partisans include leaners. Models were re-estimated excluding leaners as a robustness check and the results did not differ appreciably. These results are provided in Table 5 and 6 of the Online Appendix. 3 To determine if the means are statistically different at the 95% confidence level, we graph 84% confidence intervals for each of the means. If the 84% confidence intervals do not overlap, we can conclude that the difference between two means is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level (Julious 2004) . 4 In each case, the gap is the difference in weighted mean policy preferences for men and women in each issue area.
American Party Women 8 though women's issues have become increasingly polarized Republican women hold more moderate views than male copartisans across a range of women's issues. Women (mean=0.32) are also more likely than men (mean=0.51) to favor the millionaire tax [F(1,5440)= 8.00, p<=.01]. Nevertheless, women are no more likely than men to favor increased public expenditures for welfare benefits.
With respect to issues linked to violence and use of force, Republican women (mean=0.20) are far more likely than Republican men (mean=0.54) to favor gun control [F(1,5855)= 41.10, p<.001] . This is the largest within party gender difference (gender gap=0.34) in our analysis. But, women are no more likely than men to favor defense spending. Finally, Republican women are slightly more likely to support gay rights than are Republican men (gender gap=0.10), although the difference is only marginally significant [F(1,5839)= 3.54, p=.06]. There are no differences on abortion or immigration. All together, significant within-party gender differences exist for
Republicans on six of the ten issues.
[ Figure 1 Here]
The Gender Gap among Democrats
Whereas Republican men and women hold significantly different positions on a number of issues, Democratic men and women have similar views for all but three issue areas. Women (mean= -0.46) are far more likely than men (mean= -0.17) to favor gun control [F(1,5855 )= 35.82, p<.001] .
As with Republicans, the gender gap on gun control is the largest within party gender difference among Democrats. By contrast to women's more liberal views on gun control, men tend to have more liberal views than women on healthcare spending [F(1,5874)= 7.36, p<.01] and defense spending [F(1,5164)= 6.12, p<.01]. Yet, unlike the gender gaps observed among Republicans, the gender gaps for healthcare spending and defense spending are not statistically significant when we control for other important demographic characteristics (see Table 4 in Online Appendix).
Moreover the magnitude of the within party gender gaps for healthcare (gender gap=0.11) and
American Party Women 9 defense spending (gender gap=0.13) are less than half the size of the gun control gender gap (gender gap=0.29).
Thus, we find asymmetrical support for our Party-Sorting Hypothesis. Figure 1b shows that the biggest differences in policy preferences exist between political parties, with Republican women and men exhibiting more conservative policy preferences than Democratic women and men. This fits with accounts of party sorting (e.g. Kaufmann 2006; Gillion et al. 2015) . However, significant within-party gender differences are also evident-although primarily within the Republican Party.
Thus, it appears that gender continues to offers some explanatory power for policy attitudes, even when taking into account party, indicating that party sorting is not sufficient to explain all gender differences in public opinion.
Gender Gaps among Engaged Partisans
Extant research on party sorting shows that sorting occurs primarily among politically engaged and aware citizens. As a result, the cross-party gender gap may be largest among this subset of highly engaged partisans, as these citizens are better positioned to align themselves with the party that best represents their policy preferences (e.g. Gillion et al. 2015) , whereas within-party gender differences are likely to be smallest among this group. To evaluate our Engaged-Partisans Hypothesis we distinguish among partisans that are more and less engaged by comparing primary voters to nonvoters. 5 We compare within-party gender differences using the same difference-in-means approach described above.
[ Figure 2 Here]
Gender Gaps Among Engaged Republicans
5 Past work has also relied on political sophistication (Zaller 1992; Carsey and Layman 2006) and education (Gillion et al. 2015) to distinguish among engaged partisans. Our findings are robust to alternative measures of "engaged partisans" (see page 20, Figures 2, 3, and 4 in the Online Appendix).
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Consistent with previous literature, Republican primary voters tend to be more conservative than Republican non-voters (see Figure 2a) All told, we observe more gender differences among primary voters than among non-voters, indicating that gender gaps in public opinion are not simply a function of incomplete or imperfect sorting among people with low levels of political engagement. Instead, our results show that even after party sorting takes place, gender remains an important factor for understanding public opinion among Republicans. Overall, the trends presented in Figures 2a and 2b do not demonstrate support for our Engaged-Partisans Hypothesis, which posits that we will see fewer gender differences among primary voters relative to nonvoters of the same party. Instead, gender differences occur regardless of partisans' levels of engagement. Further, with respect to Republicans, there are more gender gaps among primary voters than non-voters, suggesting that gender differences observed among Republicans in Figure 1b are not driven by a lack of political engagement or awareness. Thus, although partisan sorting is clearly at work and is useful for explaining average gender differences in partisanship, unexplained gender differences in policy preferences exist within parties.
Gender Gaps Among Engaged Democrats
Understanding these differences and their origins may be particularly meaningful among
Republicans, for whom we see considerable preference heterogeneity based on gender and levels of research on the origins of the gender gap, we move beyond description of gender differences and into a theoretical and empirical investigation of the foundations of gender differences in partisanship and public opinion.
Origins of Gender Gaps in Issue Attitudes
Research on the origins of various political gender gaps has focused on the different social roles, expectations, and stereotypes associated with men and women. Social role theory maintains that gender differences in the aggregate division of labor (both in terms of household labor and occupational segregation) create stereotypic expectations about men's and women's behavior (Eagly et al. 2000) . People respond to and internalize these expectations, particularly when they themselves occupy gender-stereotypic roles in their families and the workplace. As a result, stereotypic traits and behaviors are commonly reinforced in men and women, such that men assume more agentic, agency-oriented traits and women assume more communal traits associated with concern for others American Party Women 13 (Wood and Eagly 2002) . These traits, which stem from common social roles, have implications for public opinion on a variety of political issues (Eagly et al. 2004 (Schlesinger and Heldman 2001) . Because of these close associations between women's traditional roles and gender gaps in these policy areas, such policies are commonly considered "women's issues" (Reingold 2000; Swers 2002 ).
In addition to specific traits, social roles are associated with broader gender differences in social status. Men's and women's different social, economic, and political statuses translate to differential endorsement of status-oriented ideologies including political conservatism, social dominance orientation, and modern sexism (Jost et al. 2009 ). There is evidence that these orientations toward status and hierarchy underlie gender differences in policy attitudes (Diekman and Schneider 2010). For instance, men's higher status is associated with a greater tendency to support policies that support or enhance the status quo (Jost and Kay 2005) , whereas women support policies that tend to reduce hierarchy, such as social welfare programs (Pratto et al. 1997 ).
Gender differences in beliefs about gender-based inequality follow a similar pattern. Men and women differ in their beliefs about the persistence and origins of gender inequality in society, ostensibly due to differences in personal experiences with gender discrimination (Manza and Brooks 1998) . On average men are more likely to attribute gender-based inequality to individual women and their personal choices, while women are more likely to attribute inequality to systematic discrimination against women (Swim et al. 1995) . These beliefs about the origins of gender-based inequality-often referred to as modern sexism-shape policy attitudes. Individuals high in modern sexism are less likely to support policies explicitly designed to mitigate gender inequalities or those
American Party Women 14 policies that disproportionately benefit women, such as welfare policies. Gender differences in modern sexism cut across the ideological spectrum, with women reporting lower levels of modern sexism than men regardless of their ideological identification (Cassese et al. 2015) . Thus, we also posit that men's and women's differential levels of modern sexism work to explain the gender gap we observed among Republicans-particularly their preferences over "women's issues."
Gender differences in socialization, roles, and status are also thought to influence core political values. In particular, gendered patterns are evident in support for a broad scope of government involvement and egalitarian values. As noted above, men's higher social status decreases the likelihood that they believe gender-based inequality and social inequality more generally is caused by and sustained through discrimination. Because we observe more gender-based heterogeneity among Republicans relative to Democrats-both in terms of the policy attitudes and our hypothesized mediators-we examine the sources of the Republican gender gap. 6 We compared the estimated effect of respondent gender on issues attitudes in a multivariate model without the hypothesized moderators to one that included the hypothesized moderators (Baron and Kenny 1986). We used a Seemingly Unrelated Regression/Logit (SUR/SUL) method which combines the estimates from multiple models that are jointly estimated to obtain the variance-covariance matrix for coefficients produced by different models, which is necessary to compute accurate standard errors for comparisons of coefficients across models. Then, we used Adjusted Wald Tests to indicate whether the differences in coefficient sizes associated with respondent gender across models that include and exclude our hypothesized moderators are statistically significant. 6 Models for Democrats revealed comparatively little evidence of mediation (see Online Appendix - Table 4 ). For gender and party differences on the mediators see Figure 1 of the Online Appendix. Tests demonstrate that the difference in coefficient size between the models is statistically significant in each case at the p<.001 level. This finding is consistent with our Mediation Hypothesis.
Attitudes toward welfare, immigration, and defense are an exception to this pattern; male and female Republicans hold comparable views in these policy areas. The initial effect on gender on support for welfare is negative but not statistically significant. Inclusion of the mediators flips the sign, such that Republican women are actually more conservative than Republican men when ideology, scope of government, and modern sexism are accounted for, though this effect is still not statistically significant. This is an interesting result in light of existing scholarship, which argues that men and women's attitudes toward social welfare issues have become increasingly correlated with partisanship over time (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999; Norrander 1999) . It suggests that party sorting largely accommodates gender differences in welfare preferences, though we observe that for most other issue areas there is a residual effect of gender.
Unpacking Multiple Mediation
Looking at the effects of the mediators, some patterns are apparent. Ideology and scope of government influence opinion across all issue areas. Modern sexism and egalitarianism have large effects on policy areas that are typically thought of as women's issues-childcare, education, healthcare, and welfare-though they exert sporadic influence on other policy areas (e.g. millionaire tax) as well. Although these factors have a significant effect on policy attitudes, we do not get a clear picture of the extent to which gender is mediated by each variable using this approach. To better unpack the multiple sources of mediation, we re-estimated the models using Structural Equation
Modeling (SEM). This approach allows us to directly estimating the direct effect of gender on policy
American Party Women 18 attitudes, along with the indirect effects channeled through each individual mediator. It also allows us to simultaneously model the covariances between mediators. An example of this modeling strategy is provided in Figure 3 , which shows the relationships among respondent gender, the mediating beliefs and values, and support for subsidized childcare. With the mediators included in the model, the direct effect of gender is zero. The indirect effect is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that women's more moderate preferences toward subsidized childcare are a function of these intervening beliefs and values. We further decomposed these indirect effects by mediator ( Table 2 ). For the childcare preferences model, beliefs about the proper scope of government and modern sexism account for 83 percent of the effect of gender on support for subsidized childcare.
[ Figure 3 & Table 2 Here]
This approach was used for each of the ten policy areas. Indirect effects of gender for each mediator are provided in the first four columns of Table 2 , followed by the direct effect of gender, the combined total indirect effect for all four mediators and the total proportion of the effect of gender that is mediated in each model. Looking across the individual mediators (columns 1-4), it is clear that beliefs about the appropriate scope of government and modern sexism account for most of the Republican gender gap. In eight of ten cases, the indirect effect of gender on policy attitudes conveyed through scope of government is statistically significant. The same is true in eight of ten cases for modern sexism. The two mediators have roughly similar effect sizes across policy areas, such that both are accounting for similar portions of the Republican gender gaps. By contrast, ideology plays a negligible role in explaining the gender gap and egalitarianism does offer any explanatory purchase.
The rightmost column of Table 2 indicates the total proportion of the gender gap in policy attitudes that is explained by the mediators. The mediators explain over one third of the gender gap American Party Women 19
for eight of the ten issue areas and over half of the gender gap for six of the ten issue areas. While there is still some residual variance in many cases, a substantial portion of the Republican gender gap is explained by the factors explored here.
Conclusion
The gender gap literature has tended to focus on the gender differences in partisanship, highlighting the factors that account for women's greater affinity with the Democratic Party and men's greater affinity with the Republican Party (e.g. Kaufmann 2002 ). We find evidence of withinparty gender gaps, particularly in the Republican Party. We think the differences between the parties reflect the outcomes of long-term party sorting mechanisms. As a result of the movement of southern white men from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party (Kauffmann and Petrocik 1999), the Democratic Party has lost some of its more moderate constituents and has become more internally cohesive with respect to policy positions. 10 Within the Republican Party, gender still consistently exerts a unique effect on policy positions. Gender gaps in the GOP occur in policy areas that are commonly considered "women's issues"-abortion, subsidized childcare, education, and healthcare-although Republican gender gaps are also evident for other issues, such as gay rights, the millionaire tax, and gun control. These results are consistent with prior claims that "conservative women are gender-conscious political actors" (Schreiber 2008, 475) and also the notion that gender issues "have not been absorbed into the party system" (Sanbonmatsu 2002, 202) .
We trace the origins of the gender gaps within the Republican Party to gender differences in beliefs about the appropriate scope of government, attitudes toward gender-based social inequality, and-to a lesser extent-ideological extremity. These results are consistent with literature suggesting that women's roles and experiences cause them to endorse different beliefs and values (e.g. Carroll
2006
; Howell and Day 2000) . While these factors explain a significant portion of the Republican 10 For more on regional differences in the gender gap, see Ondercin (2013) .
gender gaps, they do not explain opinion on gun control and gay rights. Beyond this, even when moderate women are able to gain elective office, their influence on policy is constrained by party culture. The Democratic Party is known as a coalition party with many 11 Some evidence suggests these issues have relatively low salience for Republican women. The ANES contains a question asking how important gun control is to you personally; only 32.2% of Republican women said it was very or extremely important. By contrast, 86.09% felt reducing the budget deficit was very or extremely important. Deckman (2012) similarly demonstrates that GOP women place significantly less emphasis on gay rights than economic issues.
diverse internal constituencies, whereas Republicans are governed more by a culture that values singular identification with the party, conformity with the party platform, and eschews special interest claims (Freeman 1986 ). Because of the Republican Party's more individualistic culture, women's groups lose credibility when they make claims on behalf of women as a group. Making group-based claims "call[s] into question the universal desirability of the Republican program (Freedman, 1986, 338) ." Similarly other elites in the GOP -such as activists and donors -who act as "policy demanders" and advocate for policy change, endorse traditional beliefs about gender and These cultural differences at the elite level also help to explain some of what we observe at the mass level. Women in the Democratic Party have played a more active role in shaping policy and the party platform given its greater acceptance of special interest claims (Freeman 1986) , and male
Democrats at the national level have largely embraced this women's rights policy agenda (Wolbrecht 2000) . As a result, male and female Democrats in the electorate have converged in their positions on these issues over time. On the Republican side, the more moderate policy views of women have not been integrated into major legislation or the party platforms. As a result, gender gaps persist among
Republicans in the electorate. Because party culture also constrains women in the mass public, we have not seen moderate Republican women emerge as a major force for change within the electorate. Instead these gender gaps reflect a significant, but latent, division within the party.
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It is also worth noting that issue positions are not the sole drivers of partisan identity.
Partisanship is a symbolic attachment and policy attitudes do not need to perfectly 'match' their group identity (Green et al 2004; Mason 2015) . These gender gap issues are thus insufficient to drive women from the Republican Party, especially given the distance observed between the two parties on these issues. Issue salience likely moderates the relationship between these issues and party identification. To the extent that these gap issues are chronically less important or salient to voters than economic issues, they may not exert much cross pressure against women's partisan identity.
Deckman's (2012) analysis of issue importance among GOP and Tea Party women demonstrated that the economy, energy, healthcare, and terrorism are the issues that most strongly shape vote choice. If these policy considerations dominate the party platform and campaign rhetoric, we are unlikely to see much effort toward substantive policy change on the gender gap issues at the elite level. Similarly, it is unlikely that we will see shifts in partisanship among moderate Republican women in the electorate-e.g. a mass defection to independent identification. However, a shift in issue salience might activate divisions between men and women, making them more politically consequential in the future.
Finally, the representational implications of this research extend beyond the United States.
Historically, left-wing parties hosted the majority of women in parliaments and exhibited a better increasingly, parties from across the political spectrum make claims on women's behalf (Piscopo 2014 .76
Welfare Thinking about public expenditure on welfare benefits, should there be --([much more than now, somewhat more than now, the same as now, somewhat less than now, or much less than now / much less than now, somewhat less than now, the same as now, somewhat more than now, or much more than now])? Gun Control Do you think the federal government should make it more difficult for people to buy a gun than it is now, make it easier for people to buy a gun, or keep the rules about the same as they --
Scope of Government
A composite scale consisting of the following six items, coded so that high scores correspond to preferences for limited government: 1. Which of the two statements comes closer to your view: (1) the main reason government has become bigger over the years is because it has gotten involved in things that people should do for themselves; OR (2) government has become bigger because the problems we face have become bigger. 2. Which of the two statements comes closer to your view: (1) the less government, the better; OR (2) there are more things that government should be doing? 3. Which of the two statements comes closer to your view: (1) we need a strong government to handle today's complex economic problems; OR (2) the free market can handle these problems without government being involved. 4. How much government regulation of business is good for society?
[ (1) $5,000, to "greater than $250,000" Employed A series of dummy variables indicating employment status, with unemployed and retired serving as the baseline categories.
--Homemaker Age
Respondent age in years.
--Kids < 18
The number of children under the age of 18 living in the respondents home.
--Black A series of dummy variables indicating respondent race. White is the excluded category.
--Hispanic Other Race Primary Voter Dummy variable coded 1 if respondents voted in the primary and 0 otherwise.
--Political Knowledge Additive score of correct responses to the four office recognition items.
.70
Where indicated, items were combined to form standardized variables. Standardization was performed using the weighted sample means and standard deviations for each item and set of items.
American Party Women -Online Appendix 5 Note: Egalitarianism is reversed here, such that high scores correspond to anti-egalitarian positions. In the models presented in the paper, high scores on egalitarianism correspond to greater endorsement of egalitarian views. 
Mediation Analyses
In this section, we present the fully specified mediation models for Republicans (Table 3) and Democrats (Table 4 ). In the text of the manuscript we present curtailed models for Republicans (excluding control variables). The Republican models presented here, are the same as those in the text but also include the coefficients for all of the control variables in the analyses. Survey weights are applied. Differences in the coefficient sizes for respondent gender are evaluated using Adjusted Wald Tests. Models are restricted to Democratic respondents, including learners. Adjusted R 2 for ordered logits are calculated using Wherry's formula. ^ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Mediation Analyses Excluding Political Leaners
The main analyses in our manuscript codes Republicans as those individuals who identify as a "Strong Republican," "Republican," and "Lean Republican." Similarly, Democrats are those individuals who identify as "Strong Democrat," "Democrat," and "Lean Democrat." We reestimated the mediation models from the manuscript excluding the leaners. A comparison of the models that include and exclude leaners reveals only modest differences. Even when excluding political leaners, we still observe significant gender gaps among Republicans in the same 7 of 10 issue areas and evidence of mediation is still found in each of these cases. Similarly we observe gender gaps among the Democrats in the same 3 of 10 issues and mediation in the same two of these areas. These results are presented in Tables 5 and 6 . Survey weights are applied. Differences in the coefficient sizes for respondent gender are evaluated using Adjusted Wald Tests. Models are restricted to Republican respondents, excluding learners. Adjusted R 2 for ordered logits are calculated using Wherry's formula. ^ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Survey weights are applied. Models are restricted to Republican female respondents, including learners. Adjusted R 2 for ordered logits are calculated using Wherry's formula. ^ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Survey weights are applied. Models are restricted to Republican male respondents, including learners. Adjusted R 2 for ordered logits are calculated using Wherry's formula. ^ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 14 -0.00 Entries are coefficients from OLS and Logit Models with standard errors in parentheses. Survey weights are applied. Models are restricted to Democratic male respondents, including learners. Adjusted R 2 for ordered logits are calculated using Wherry's formula. ^ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Survey weights are applied. Models are restricted to Republican respondents, including learners. ^ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
Policy Preferences: Alternative Measures of Engaged Partisans
In this section we first replicate Figure 2a from our original analysis where we compare the policy preferences of Republicans who voted in the primary election to those who did not vote in the primary election. Then, we replicate this figure using two alternative measures of "engaged partisans." The first measure compares Republicans who voted in the general election to those who did not vote in the general election, and second measure compares those who voted in the primary election to those who did not vote in either the general or primary election. These figures indicate that the results reported in figure 2a are robust to alternative measures of engaged partisans. 
